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I. INTRODUCTION 
For centuries, Anglo-American jurisprudence has been grounded by 
the doctrine of stare decisis, which holds that similar cases should be 
decided by similar legal principles rather than by the personal views of 
an ever-changing judiciary. For if the law is not predictable, it can be 
undermined as arbitrary and capricious. Nevertheless the passage of 
years sometimes reveals a dynamic and changing common law that 
requires reconsideration of prior judicial precedent. For if the law is not 
flexible, it can be undermined as extreme. 
There is an inherent tension in the law between predictability, on 
the one hand, and flexibility, on the other. This tension is most vividly 
on display when prior legal precedents confront new jurists who disagree 
with them. Flexibility may demand a modification or overruling of such 
precedent, but to do so may undermine legal relationships throughout 
society that have been ordered by such precedent for years or decades. 
This adjustment is no small matter. Overruling precedent to provide 
justice in a particular case between particular parties may lead to turmoil 
across a larger population that had ordered its affairs upon the decisions 
of the past. Moreover, in states like Ohio where judges are elected, if all 
that is needed to change the law is political control of the judiciary, then 
whenever politics change, the law will change—complicating the lives 
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of all members of society. 
To successfully navigate between the poles of predictability and 
flexibility, the judiciary needed a rule that weighed both—that neither 
unduly limited the common law to the opinions of long gone jurists nor 
commanded change simply because the judiciary had changed. 
Chief Justice Maureen O’Connor,1 and the majority that joined her, 
may have brought Ohio such a rule in Westfield Insurance Co. v. 
Galatis.
2
 Galatis provides that, to overrule existing precedent of the 
Ohio Supreme Court, three factors must coalesce: (1) the Court must 
conclude that “the decision was wrongly decided at that time, or changes 
in circumstances no longer justify continued adherence to the decision, 
(2) the decision must defy practical workability, and (3) abandoning the 
precedent would not create an undue hardship for those who have relied 
upon it.”3 This Article explores the need for a doctrine permitting, but 
limiting, the overruling of prior precedent; Ohio’s adoption of such a 
rule; and whether the current standard will endure. To fully appreciate 
the need for a rule that permits but also limits the overruling of prior 
Supreme Court precedent, it is helpful to understand the historical 
context in which the Galatis rule developed. Section II of this Article 
discusses the political and ideological changes that swept the Ohio 
judiciary in the early 1990s with the election of two new Justices to the 
 
* Richard M. Garner is currently the Managing Partner of Davis & Young’s Columbus, Ohio, 
Office where he focuses his practice on insurance coverage, appellate practice, and complex 
litigation. He has handled over 60 cases in the Supreme Court of Ohio, including some of the most 
important Ohio insurance cases in recent history. In 2003, he was selected as “Lawyer of the Year” 
by Ohio Lawyers’ Weekly. Since 2005, he has yearly been named as a “Rising Star” or 
“SuperLawyer” by Ohio Super Lawyers/Cincinnati Magazine and is “AV” rated by Martindale-
Hubbell. He is also listed in Best Lawyers in America® for insurance law. In 2007, the Ohio State 
Bar Association certified him as an “Appellate Specialist.” From 2008 until 2013, he served as a 
member of the Appellate Specialty Certification Board of the Ohio State Bar Association. Since 
2008, he has also served on the Board of Trustees for the Ohio Association of Civil Trial Attorneys 
(“OACTA”) and is active in various committees and positions. In 2013, he was awarded OACTA’s 
“Outstanding Advocacy Award” for his handling of high profile insurance cases in Ohio. But this 
biography would be remiss without special thanks to Lucas Baker, Davis & Young’s newest 
associate, for his assistance in providing research for this article. 
 1.  Throughout this article, I refer to Chief Justice O’Connor at various times as either 
“Justice O’Connor” or “Chief Justice O’Connor” depending upon her position at the time of the 
events being related. She became Chief Justice in 2011. Her full biography can be found online at 
Chief Justice Maureen O’Connor, SUPREME CT. OF OHIO, http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/
SCO/justices/oconnor/default.aspx (last visited Dec. 7, 2014). 
 2.  Westfield Ins. Co. v. Galatis, 100 Ohio St. 3d 216, 2003-Ohio-5849, 797 N.E.2d 1256. I 
had the privilege of serving as counsel for the prevailing insurer in Galatis, which, despite the case 
caption, was not “Westfield Insurance Company” but rather “Aetna Casualty and Surety Company 
(Travelers).” My now-deceased mentor and friend, Henry A. Hentemann, was my co-counsel. I am 
much in his debt for many things, including my involvement in the case. 
 3.  Id. at ¶ 48. 
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Ohio Supreme Court. The new Justices quickly set about changing 
Ohio’s legal landscape by striking down legislation and overruling 
judicial precedent. Section III reveals that, within a decade, opposing 
interests mobilized their political base leading to a new and different 
political/ideological majority. Rather than undertake yet another revision 
to Ohio’s judicial precedent, Chief Justice O’Connor and the new 
majority crafted a new rule of stare decisis. This new rule promised to 
mitigate the instability of such political changes, yet still allow changes 
in the common law—providing both predictability and flexibility. 
Section IV explores the durability of the Galatis rule for overruling prior 
precedent of the Ohio Supreme Court. The question is: will it last? 
The full historical context is much richer than such a short article 
can describe, but I hope to provide an accurate snapshot of that 
particular part with which I am well familiar. 
II. A CHANGING JUDICIARY CHANGES THE LAW 
In 1993, the Supreme Court of Ohio underwent one of its periodic 
political shakeups as Justices Francis Sweeney and Paul Pfeifer joined 
sitting Justices Andrew Douglas and Alice Robie Resnick on the high 
court. Together, the Justices formed one of the most potent 4-3 voting 
blocks in recent history. Over the next decade, these four Justices deeply 
impacted Ohio insurance law—particularly in the area of 
uninsured/underinsured motorist (“UM/UIM”) coverage.4 
Among their decisions were the following: 
 In 1993, they held that certain anti-stacking provisions 
were unenforceable and revised the manner in which setoff 
of tortfeasor liability provisions were interpreted.
5
 
 In 1994, they held that insurers could not exclude UM/UIM 
coverage for non-covered automobiles.
6
 
 In 1996, they retroactively invalidated most rejections of 
 
 4.  Their reach went beyond insurance law and extended to such areas as tort reform and 
public school financing (in which the high court demanded a $1 billion-plus reorganization of state 
school funding). See JONATHAN H. ADLER & CHRISTINA M. ADLER, FEDERALIST SOC’Y, A MORE 
MODEST COURT: THE OHIO SUPREME COURT’S NEWFOUND JUDICIAL RESTRAINT 3 (2008), 
available at https://www.fed-soc.org/publications/detail/a-more-modest-court-the-ohio-supreme-
courts-newfound-judicial-restraint. 
 5.  See Savoie v. Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 620 N.E.2d 809, 814 (Ohio 1993). For a more 
detailed look at Savoie, see Matthew Devery McCormack, Comment, Tracking Ohio Insurance 
Coverage: The Genesis and Demise of Savoie, 20 U. DAYTON L. REV. 293 (1994). 
 6.  See Martin v. Midwestern Grp. Ins. Co., 639 N.E.2d 438, 441 (Ohio 1994). For a more 
detailed look at Martin, see Alan E. Mazur, Note, Martin v. Midwestern Group Insurance Co.: 
Something For Nothing, 24 CAP. U. L. REV. 667 (1995). 
3
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UM/UIM coverage by creating extra-statutory UM/UIM 
offer requirements.
7
 
 In 1999: 
 they held that general liability policies could 
provide UM/UIM coverage by operation of law 
thereby extending the application of Ohio’s 
UM/UIM statute beyond traditional automobile 
liability policies;
8
 and 
 in Scott-Pontzer v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 
they held that standard commercial automobile 
policies provided UM/UIM coverage to employees 
and their residential family at all times, regardless 
of whether they were in a vehicle owned by their 
employer or performing work for that employer.
9
 
 In 2000: 
 they again retroactively invalidated most rejections 
of UM/UIM coverage by creating additional extra-
statutory offer elements;
10
 and 
 they held that insurers could not limit UM/UIM 
coverage to insureds who had actually suffered 
bodily injury, but must extend such coverage for 
loss of consortium claims even though the Ohio 
General Assembly had ostensibly amended Ohio’s 
UM/UIM statute to permit such limitations in 
1994.
11
 
These cases were particularly vexing for insurers for a variety of 
reasons, the most important of which were that the cases often overruled 
recent judicial precedent
12
 and the cases were retrospective in 
 
 7.  See Gyori v. Johnston Coca-Cola Bottling Grp., Inc., 669 N.E.2d 824, 827 (Ohio 1996). 
 8.  See Selander v. Erie Ins. Grp., 709 N.E.2d 1161, 1165 (Ohio 1999). 
 9.  See Scott-Pontzer v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 710 N.E.2d 1116, 1119-20 (Ohio 1999); 
see also Ezawa v. Yasuda Fire & Marine Ins. Co. of Am., 715 N.E.2d 1142, 1143 (Ohio 1999) 
(following Scott-Pontzer). 
 10.  See Linko v. Indem. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 739 N.E.2d 338, 342 (Ohio 2000). For the Ohio 
Department of Insurance’s summary of the Scott-Pontzer and Linko decisions and their impact, see 
OHIO DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE, UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE IN 
OHIO: REPORT REQUIRED BY SENATE BILL 97, at 2-4 (2003) [hereinafter “UM/UIM Report”], 
available at http://www.insurance.ohio.gov/Legal/Reports/Documents/Senate_Bill_97_Report.pdf. 
 11.  See More v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 723 N.E.2d 97, 101-02 (Ohio 2000). 
 12.  See Savoie v. Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 620 N.E.2d 809, 813 (Ohio 1993) (overruling State 
Farm Auto Ins. Co. v. Rose, 575 N.E.2d 459 (Ohio 1991) and Burris v. Grange Mut. Cos., 545 
N.E.2d 83 (Ohio 1989)); Martin v. Midwestern Grp. Ins. Co., 639 N.E.2d 438, 441-42 (Ohio 1994) 
(overruling Hedrick v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 488 N.E.2d 840 (Ohio 1986)). 
4
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application.
13
 At the time, Ohio had a 15-year statute of limitations on 
related actions, which allowed a great many “closed” personal injury 
files to be “resurrected.”14 This triggered a huge increase in the number 
of UM/UIM claims. First, virtually all UM/UIM rejections were 
retroactively invalidated, thus driving up the number of claims. Next, 
because the commercial UM/UIM coverage was expanded, more 
claimants were considered “underinsured.” This was due to the fact that 
personal auto policy limits of tortfeasors were usually much less than the 
limits of commercial UM/UIM coverage.
15
 Further, UM/UIM insurers 
were more likely to require claimants to make claims with other 
triggered UM/UIM insurance to seek the benefit of other insurance 
provisions.
16
 
These problems had a dramatic effect on the insurance industry. By 
2001, insurance industry observers were estimating that the 1999 Scott-
Pontzer decision alone had cost insurers over $1.5 billion.
17
 To put this 
in context, after only two years and with no end in sight, Scott-Pontzer 
alone had compelled insurers to pay about twice the damage reported to 
have been suffered as a result of Hurricane Irene (which also occurred in 
1999).
18
 After 2000, the Ohio Department of Insurance reported that 
commercial UM/UIM rates increased by an average of 170%.
19
 
With such money flowing, it was predictable that UM/UIM 
litigation activity would increase. Ohio’s courts of common pleas were 
the frontline for the corresponding litigation explosion. From 1999 to 
2003, these courts saw related new civil case filings increase nearly 
 
 13.  See Ross v. Farmers Ins. Grp. of Cos., 695 N.E.2d 732, 738 (Ohio 1998) (noting the 
general rule regarding retroactivity established in Peerless Elec. Co. v. Bowers, 129 N.E.2d 467, 
468 (Ohio 1955)). 
 14.  See UM/UIM REPORT, supra note 10, at 4. 
 15.  See Clark v. Scarpelli, 744 N.E.2d 719, 724 (Ohio 2001); see also UM/UIM REPORT, 
supra note 10, at 2-3. At the time, state minimum financial responsibility limits in Ohio were 
$12,500 per person and $25,000 per accident while commercial UM/UIM coverage was often 
provided at limits of greater than $500,000 per accident. Matthew J. Cavanaugh, Slamming the Lid 
on Pandora’s Box: How the Ohio Legislature Compensated the Insurance Industry for Scott-
Pontzer at the Expense of Ohio Drivers, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 997, 1023-26 (2005). 
 16.  See, e.g., Halliwill v. State Farm Ins. Co., No. 21488, 2003-Ohio-6809, at ¶¶ 2-4 (Ct. 
App. Dec. 17, 2003); Justus v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 02AP-1222, 2003-Ohio-3913, at ¶¶ 1-14 (Ct. 
App. July 22, 2003). 
 17.  See, e.g., Gibson v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 178 F. Supp. 2d 921, 922 n.1 (S.D. Ohio 
2001). I have not seen reliable estimates on the combined costs of the other decisions. 
 18.  LIXION A. AVILA, NATIONAL HURRICANE CTR., PRELIMINARY REPORT: HURRICANE 
IRENE 13-19 OCTOBER, 1999, at 3 (1999), available at http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/
data/tcr/AL131999_Irene.pdf. 
 19.  See UM/UIM REPORT, supra note 10, at 6. 
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20%.
20
 Ohio’s intermediate courts of appeals saw new civil case filings 
increase nearly 10% during the same timeframe.
21
 By 2003, the Ohio 
Supreme Court had over 100 related appeals pending, addressing various 
nuances of the Scott-Pontzer phenomenon.
22
 
Tension within the legislature also increased. In the seven years 
between 1994 and 2001, the Ohio General Assembly amended Ohio’s 
UM/UIM statute
23
 five times in a race to keep up with the 
pronouncements flowing from Ohio’s high court.24 This contest 
culminated in the 2001 Senate Bill 97 amendments, which eliminated 
mandatory offers of UM/UIM coverage and precluded the possibility of 
judicial imposition of UM/UIM coverage “by operation of law.”25 
 
 20.  See generally THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO, THE OHIO COURTS SUMMARY (1999-
2003), available at http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/Publications/default.asp. The Ohio Supreme 
Court reports the following categories for common pleas courts: professional tort, product liability, 
other torts, workers compensation, foreclosures, administrative appeals, complex litigation, other 
civil and criminal. UM/UIM cases were not individually tracked, so the percentages were obtained 
by comparing the combined “other torts” and “other civil” categories by year. There could be other 
reasons for spikes in filings (for example, House Bill 350 tort reform in 1997), but none was 
apparent from the data for 1999 to 2003. 
 21.  See id. The Ohio Supreme Court does not report civil appeals by category. Accordingly, 
the percentages were obtained by simply comparing the “new cases filed” by year. 
 22.  In re Uninsured & Underinsured Motorists Coverage Cases, 100 Ohio St. 3d 302, 2003-
Ohio-5888, 798 N.E.2d 1077. 
 23.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3937.18 (West, Westlaw through Files 1 to 140 and Statewide 
Issue 1 of the 130th GA (2013-2014)). 
 24.  See id. The amendments included: 2001 S 97, eff. 10-31-01; 2000 S 267, eff. 9-21-00; 
1999 S 57, eff. 11-2-99; 1997 H 261, eff. 9-3-97; 1994 S 20, eff. 10-20-94. 
 25.  S.B. 97, 124th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2001). The uncodified provisions of S.B. 
97 provide, in pertinent part, that the General Assembly’s intent was the following: 
(B) Express the public policy of the state to: 
(1) Eliminate any requirement of the mandatory offer of uninsured motorist coverage, 
underinsured motorist coverage, or both uninsured and underinsured motorist coverages; 
(2) Eliminate the possibility of uninsured motorist coverage, underinsured motorist cov-
erage, or both uninsured and underinsured motorist coverages being implied as a matter 
of law in any insurance policy; 
. . . 
(4) Eliminate any requirement of a written offer, selection, or rejection form for unin-
sured, underinsured motorist coverage, or both uninsured and underinsured motorist 
coverages from any transaction for an insurance policy; 
. . . 
(E) To supersede the holdings of the Ohio Supreme Court in [Linko v. Indemnity Insur-
ance Co. of N. America] (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 445, [Scott-Pontzer v. Liberty Mutual 
Fire Insurance Co.] (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 660 . . . [Gyori v. Johnston Coca-Cola Bot-
tling Group, Inc.] (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 565, and their progeny. 
Despite dire predictions that S.B. 97 would cause a “race to the bottom,” in which insurers sought to 
avoid providing UM/UIM altogether, the Ohio Department of Insurance reports that the percentage 
of policies providing UM/UIM coverage remained “fairly stable” following S.B. 97. UM/UIM 
REPORT, supra note 10, at 4-5. 
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All of the foregoing suggested that a political change might be 
coming to the Ohio Supreme Court. And in 2003, it did. 
In 2002, Justice Douglas retired. In the wake of his retirement, 
Maureen O’Connor, who was a common pleas court judge when the 
UM/UIM phenomenon began, was elected to the Ohio Supreme Court.
26
 
She joined the high court in January 2003.
27
 With Chief Justice Thomas 
Moyer, Justice Evelyn Lundberg Stratton, and Justice Deborah Cook, 
there was apparently a new 4-3 conservative majority on the Ohio 
Supreme Court.
28
 The question quickly arose: did a new conservative 
majority on the high court mean that the recent UM/UIM decisions 
would be short-lived? The question was fully engaged in Galatis. 
Galatis arose from a fatal traffic accident that occurred a decade 
prior.
29
 The decedent’s family had long since settled with the tortfeasor 
and their personal UM/UIM insurers.
30
 After Scott-Pontzer was decided, 
however, a plaintiff could—and these plaintiffs did—seek commercial 
UM/UIM coverage from their employers’ policies even though the 
accident had nothing to do with those employers.
31
 Both the trial court 
and the court of appeals, for different reasons, rejected the resurrected 
claims, and their lawyers appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court.
32
 
In July 2002, the high court accepted the appeal. During the 
briefing, the insurer challenged whether Scott-Pontzer was a valid 
statement of Ohio law, and the parties fully briefed the issue.
33
 The case 
was argued in March 2003, and Ohioans would wait for the next eight 
months to learn Scott-Pontzer’s fate.34 Galatis created a fairly strict 
standard for overturning prior precedent of the Ohio Supreme Court—
one that attempted to serve the interests of predictability and stability of 
prior precedents but also provide enough flexibility to permit 
overturning prior precedent to prevent unnecessary rigidity in Ohio law. 
Under this standard, the Galatis Court limited the Scott-Pontzer decision 
 
 26.  See ADLER & ADLER, supra note 4, at 5. 
 27.  See generally Chief Justice Maureen O’Connor, supra note 1. Later that year, Justice 
Terrence O’Donnell replaced Justice Cook. In 2005, Justice Judith Lanzinger replaced Justice 
Sweeney. In 2007, Justice Robert Cupp replaced Justice Resnick. See ADLER & ADLER, supra note 
4, at 4. After 2007, of the four Justices who began this article, only Justice Pfeifer remains. 
 28.  See ADLER & ADLER, supra note 4, at 4. 
 29.  Westfield Ins. Co. v. Galatis, 100 Ohio St. 3d 216, 2003-Ohio-5849, 797 N.E.2d 1256, ¶ 
3. 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Id. at ¶ 4. 
 32.  Id. at ¶¶ 6-8. 
 33.  Id. at ¶¶ 70-74 (Resnick, J., dissenting) 
 34.  Galatis was decided on November 5, 2003. 
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and overruled a companion case.
35
 
III. FLEXIBILITY PREDICTABILITY: OHIO’S NEW STARE DECISIS RULE 
From the standpoint of conservatives, the political problem is 
always that conservative judges are less likely to reverse precedent than 
judges who are considered activist. This general, very unscientific 
observation was on display when Chief Justice Earl Warren retired from 
the United States Supreme Court in 1969. Questions then arose, asking 
whether a new Nixon-appointed conservative majority might wipe away 
many landmark decisions of the Warren Court. It was then observed, 
that the newly appointed conservatives would feel constrained, under 
principles including stare decisis, to adhere to the more liberal decisions 
of the Warren Court: 
If the Warren Court’s reforms were paraded back before them, the 
erstwhile dissenters might feel bound by the doctrine of stare decisis 
(stand by settled cases) and would not be willing to discard them so 
soon. 
In fact, the “strict constructionists” that Mr. Nixon admires are the 
least likely agents of constitutional upheaval. Justice Harlan, who dis-
sented against most of the landmark liberal cases, believes so strongly 
in stare decisis that he has recently written a few liberal decisions him-
self—and has been chided by Justice Hugo Black for hobbling law en-
forcement.
36
 
Accordingly, there was concern in Ohio that, even if Scott-Pontzer was 
poorly decided and demonstrably unmanageable, Ohio’s new 
conservative majority might be reluctant to overrule it. 
Chief Justice Moyer, for one, had long been a strong advocate of 
stare decisis. His 1993 dissenting opinion in Gallimore v. Children’s 
Hospital Medical Center expressed his views on the subject well—that 
the certainty, uniformity, and continuity of law wrought by stare decisis 
should be protected: 
Blackstone said it in his Commentaries when he observed, 
“[p]recedents and rules must be followed, unless flatly absurd or un-
just[.]” . . . 
Oliver Wendell Holmes said it in Summary of Events (1873), 7 
Am.L.J. 579, when he observed, “We sincerely hope that the editors 
 
 35.  See id. at ¶¶ 61-62. 
 36.  Jon D. Noland, Stare Decisis and the Overruling of Constitutional Decisions in the 
Warren Years, 4 VAL. U. L. REV. 101, 101 (1969) (quoting another source). 
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[of the American Civil Law Journal] will fail in their expressed desire 
to diminish the weight of precedents with our courts. We believe the 
weight attached to them is about the best thing in our whole system of 
law.” 
Benjamin N. Cardozo said it in The Paradoxes of Legal Science (1928) 
29-30: “What has once been settled by a precedent will not be unset-
tled overnight, for certainty and uniformity are gains not lightly to be 
sacrificed. Above all is this true when honest men have shaped their 
conduct upon the faith of the pronouncement.” And Felix Frankfurter 
in Helvering v. Hallock (1940), 309 U.S. 106, 119 . . . said, “We rec-
ognized that stare decisis embodies an important social policy. It repre-
sents an element of continuity in law, and is rooted in the psychologic 
need to satisfy reasonable expectations.” 
These statements regarding stare decisis need no elaboration except to 
say that they enunciate a fundamental element of American jurispru-
dence—consistency and predictability.
37
 
Indeed, although Chief Justice Moyer had dissented in Scott-
Pontzer,
38
 his adherence to the principle of stare decisis had caused him 
to apply Scott-Pontzer as binding legal precedent in multiple subsequent 
decisions.
39
 Moreover, his earlier opinion in King v. Nationwide 
Insurance Co.
40
 had ostensibly formed the analytical foundation for 
Scott-Pontzer.
41
 Thus, it was by no means clear that Chief Justice Moyer 
would join any “new conservative majority” in overruling Scott-
Pontzer.
42
 If the new majority were to tackle the vexing problems 
created by Scott-Pontzer and related UM/UIM decisions, the issue of 
stare decisis would be front and center.
43
 
 
 37.  Gallimore v. Children’s Hosp. Med. Ctr., 617 N.E.2d 1052, 1062 (Ohio 1992) (Moyer, 
C.J., dissenting). 
 38.  Scott-Pontzer v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 710 N.E.2d 1116, 1122 (Ohio 1999) (Moyer, 
C.J., dissenting). 
 39.  See Bagnoli v. Northbrook Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 715 N.E.2d 125, 126 (Ohio 1999); 
Estate of Dillard v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 715 N.E.2d 126, 126; Ezawa v. Yasuda Fire & Marine 
Ins. Co. of Am., 715 N.E.2d 1142, 1143 (Ohio 1999). 
 40.  King v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 519 N.E.2d 1380 (Ohio 1988). 
 41.  See Scott-Pontzer, 710 N.E.2d at 1119 (citing King, 519 N.E.2d at 1380). 
 42.  Adding to the uncertainty of court observers was the fact that Justice Cook had recently 
been nominated to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and, therefore, would not 
participate in the Galatis decision. Instead, Judge Mary DeGenaro of Ohio’s Seventh Appellate 
District was appointed to sit for Justice Cook. SeeWestfield Ins. Co. v. Galatis, 100 Ohio St. 3d 216, 
2003-Ohio-5849, 797 N.E.2d 1256, at ¶¶ 63-64. 
 43.  Because this article deals with the doctrine of stare decisis in the Ohio Supreme Court, it 
does not delve into related issues of the following: what constitutes judicial authority (see William 
M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, The Supreme Court Rules for the Reporting of Opinions: A 
Critique, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 313, 329-34 (1985)); determination of when judicial precedent should be 
9
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At first glance, notwithstanding “rhetoric” such as that in Chief 
Justice Moyer’s Gallimore dissent, the doctrine of stare decisis might 
seem to be no more than a minor inconvenience to overruling Scott-
Pontzer. After all, some may ask, since political change had come to the 
Ohio Supreme Court, should not a legal change follow? Throughout the 
history of Ohio and the Republic, legal commentators have noted 
periods of political or cultural change in which the influence of stare 
decisis on decision-making seemed stronger, and other periods when its 
influence appeared weaker.
44
 The popular view may be that the doctrine 
is only invoked to stave off political change until such time as the 
faction out of power can orchestrate a return to decision-making power. 
However, the history and philosophy of the doctrine reveal a deeper, 
richer doctrine, which many conservative judges view as an organic part 
of the common law. 
While one can trace the roots of the doctrine back for millennia, a 
practical analysis of its present manifestation is best begun with the 
Anglo-American experience of the 18th
 
century. Blackstone considered 
the doctrine under the heading, “Of the Laws of England.”45 He divided 
the civil law of England into lex non scripta (unwritten common law) 
and lex scripta (written or statutory law).
46
 The former was generally 
comprised of longstanding “customs” which were tacito et illeterato 
hominum consensus et moribus expressum, that is, expressed by the 
silent and unwritten consent of men.
47
 Such customs had to be 
longstanding, continuous, undisputed, reasonable, certain, compulsory, 
and consistent.
48
 Of course, the question arose as to how these customs 
were to be determined, made known, and validated. Blackstone 
responded that written judicial decisions were the best evidence of such 
customs: 
And indeed these judicial decisions are the principal and most authori-
 
applied prospectively rather than retrospectively (see DiCenzo v. A Best Products Co., Inc., 120 
Ohio St. 3d 149, 2008-Ohio-5327, 897 N.E.2d 132, at paragraph one of the syllabus); or the 
relation, interaction, and differences between other limiting doctrines such as “law of the case” and 
res judicata/collateral estoppel (see Grava v. Parkman Twp., 653 N.E.2d 226, 227 (Ohio 1995); 
Nolan v. Nolan, 462 N.E.2d 410, 412 (Ohio 1984)). 
 44.  See Roscoe Pound, What of Stare Decisis?, 10 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 1-3 (1941); William 
O. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 735, 739 (1949); Robert D. Archibald, Stare Decisis 
and the Ohio Supreme Court, 9 W. RES. L. REV. 23, 34 (1957-1958); Noland, supra note 36, at 118-
21; John Wallace, Comment, Stare Decisis and the Rehnquist Court: The Collision of Activism, 
Passivism, and Politics in Casey, 42 BUFF. L. REV. 187, 201-08 (1994). 
 45.  1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *63. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  See id. at *64. 
 48.  See id. at *76-78. 
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tative evidence, that can be given, of the existence of such a custom as 
shall form a part of the common law. The judgment itself, and all the 
proceedings previous thereto, are carefully registered and preserved, 
under the name of records, in public repositories set apart for that par-
ticular purpose; and to them frequent recourse is had, when any critical 
question arises, in the determination of which former precedents may 
give light or assistance . . . . For it is an established rule to abide by 
former precedents, where the same points come again in litigation; as 
well to keep the scale of justice even and steady, and not liable to wa-
ver with every new judge’s opinion; as also because the law in that 
case being solemnly declared and determined, what before was uncer-
tain, and perhaps indifferent, is now become a permanent rule, which it 
is not in the breast of any subsequent judge to alter or vary from, ac-
cording to his private sentiments; he being sworn to determine, not ac-
cording to his own private judgment, but according to the known laws 
and customs of the land; not delegated to pronounce a new law, but to 
maintain and expound the old one.
49
 
Once rendered, such “precedents and rules must be followed, unless 
flatly absurd or unjust.”50 Where change was required because the 
precedent was “absurd or unjust,” Blackstone concluded, the change was 
made because the prior statements had not, in fact, been “the law” or 
“custom” at all, but had, instead, been adopted in error: 
[T]he subsequent judges do not pretend to make a new law, but to vin-
dicate the old one from misrepresentation. For if it be found that the 
former decision is manifestly absurd or unjust, it is declared, not that 
such a sentence was bad law, but that it was not the law; that is, that it 
is not the established custom of the realm, as has been erroneously de-
termined.
51
 
When such processes are followed, then “we may take it as a 
general rule, ‘that the decisions of the courts of justice are the evidence 
of what is common law’” and “this internal evidence of freedom along 
with it, that it probably was introduced by the voluntary consent of the 
people.”52 Thus, the judiciary did not create the “customs” upon which 
 
 49.  Id. at *69. 
 50.  Id. at *70. 
 51.  Id. Ohio currently follows a form of this rule, known as the “Peerless Doctrine.” See 
Peerless Elec. Co. v. Bowers, 129 N.E.2d 467, 468 (Ohio 1955) (“The general rule is that a decision 
of a court of supreme court jurisdiction overruling a former decision is retrospective in its operation, 
and the effect is not that the former was bad law, but that it never was the law.”). See also Ross v. 
Farmers Ins. Grp. of Cos., 695 N.E.2d 732, 737 (Ohio 1998) (following Peerless); Harper v. Va. 
Dept. of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 94-97 (1993) (applying similar doctrine under federal law). 
 52.  BLACKSTONE, supra note 45, at *71, *74. 
11
Garner: Flexible Predictability
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2015
26 AKRON LAW REVIEW [48:15 
 
the common law was based, but rather observed and recorded those 
customs as “common law.”53 
This view was carried into the American experience in the 
following decades. When the various attributes of a federal constitution 
were being considered, it was observed that if courts were endowed with 
positive power to make the law, as well as interpret it, personal freedom 
would be endangered: for “there is no liberty, if the power of judging be 
not separated from the legislative and executive powers.”54 Of the 
several limitations inherent in the nature of judicial power was the 
doctrine of stare decisis: “To avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, 
it is indispensable that they should be bound by strict rules and 
precedents, which serve to define and point out their duty in every 
particular case that comes before them.”55 For this and other reasons, it 
was argued that “the judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will 
always be the least dangerous to the political rights of the constitution; 
because it will be least in a capacity to annoy or injure them.”56 Lifetime 
judicial appointments were championed in order to insulate the judiciary 
from political pressure and to allow “long and laborious study to acquire 
competent knowledge” of judicial precedent.57 Courts were to declare 
“judgment” rather than “will” (which was left to the legislative and 
executive branches).
58
 Accordingly, it was often difficult to separate the 
doctrine of stare decisis from the doctrine of separation of powers. 
However, scholars later noted that the American experience with 
the doctrine was decidedly more relaxed than what was described by 
Blackstone or Hamilton.
59
 American judges claimed exceptions to the 
 
 53. As Pound observed in the mid-20th century: 
Rightly understood, stare decisis is a feature of the common-law technique of deci-
sion . . . . The common-law technique is based on a conception of law as experience de-
veloped by reason and reason tested and developed by experience. It is a technique of 
finding the grounds of decision in recorded judicial experience, making for stability by 
requiring adherence to decision of the same question in the past, allowing growth and 
change by the freedom of choice from competing analogies of equal authority when new 
questions arise or old ones take on new forms. 
Pound, supra note 44, at 5-6. 
 54.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, 394 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 55.  Id. at 399. 
 56.  Id. at 393. 
 57.  Id. at 399. 
 58.  Id. at 396. Later legal commentators observed that the judiciary’s legitimacy would be 
measured by whether it could “demonstrate in reasoned opinions that it has, a valid theory, derived” 
from existing law rather than “merely impos[ing] its own value choices.” Robert H. Bork, Neutral 
Principals and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 3 (1971). 
 59.  See Noland, supra note 36, at 102-03. 
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doctrine ranging from judicial discretion to the “spirit of the times”60 and 
even “a personal matter for each judge who assumes” a “sacred oath” to 
uphold the Constitution.
61
 Echoing such sentiment, the majority opinion 
in Gallimore, which had drawn Chief Justice Moyer’s strong dissent, 
pronounced: 
When the common law has been out of step with the times, and the 
legislature, for whatever reason, has not acted, we have undertaken to 
change the law and rightfully so. After all, who presides over the 
common law but the courts? . . . The common law is not static. It is 
dynamic, and it must continue to evolve to keep up with the times . . . . 
Either the common law must be modernized to conform with present 
day norms, or it will engender a lack of respect as being out of touch 
with the realities of our time.
62
 
Judges were no longer simply recorders of the common law; they 
had become fashioners of it. Such sentiment appears to be widely shared 
in the American judiciary and held by many of its luminaries. For 
instance, Oliver Wendell Holmes famously pronounced: 
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it 
was laid down in the time of Henry IV . . . [especially] if the grounds 
upon which it was laid down have vanished long since and the rule 
simply persists from blind imitation of the past.
63
 
Under such circumstances, Holmes noted all that was needed for change 
was “appetite.”64 Of course, such sentiments did not make a very 
practical rule of law. As Justice William O. Douglas later explained: 
I do not suggest that stare decisis is so fragile a thing as to bow before 
every wind. The law is not properly susceptible to whim or caprice. It 
must have the sturdy qualities required of every framework that is de-
signed for substantial structures. Moreover, it must have uniformity 
when applied to the daily affairs of men. 
Uniformity and continuity in law are necessary to many activities. If 
they are not present, the integrity of contracts, wills, conveyances and 
securities is impaired. And there will be no equal justice under law if a 
negligence rule is applied in the morning but not in the afternoon. Stare 
decisis provides some moorings so that men may trade and arrange 
 
 60.  Wallace, supra note 44, at 191. 
 61.  City of Rocky River v. State Emp’t Relations Bd., 539 N.E.2d 103, 108 (Ohio 1989). 
 62.  Gallimore v. Children’s Hosp. Med. Ctr., 617 N.E. 2d 1052, 1059-60 (Ohio 1992). 
 63.  Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897); 
Noland, supra note 36, at 103. 
 64.  See Noland, supra note 36, at 103. 
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their affairs with confidence. Stare decisis serves to take the capricious 
element out of law and to give stability to a society.
65
 
Thus, the practical American experience with the doctrine of stare 
decisis was shaped by two wings: the brooding predictability and 
stability of Blackstone and Hamilton and the flexible, declaratory 
impulses evidenced by the Gallimore majority. Both wings have been on 
display at various times in various courts throughout the nation. 
But returning to our Galatis storyline: which wing would prevail 
when the Ohio Supreme Court considered the continued vitality of Scott-
Pontzer? Eight months after oral argument, the Ohio Supreme Court 
released its decision in Galatis, which was authored by Justice 
O’Connor.66 In her opening paragraph, Justice O’Connor went directly 
to the heart of the matter—the nature of stare decisis: 
Stare decisis is the bedrock of the American judicial system. Well-
reasoned opinions become controlling precedent, thus creating stability 
and predictability in our legal system. It is only with great solemnity 
and with the assurance that the newly chosen course for the law is a 
significant improvement over the current course that we should depart 
from precedent.
67
 
But while she noted that “this court is no stranger to overruling 
precedent, we have not adopted a standard by which to judge whether a 
past decision should be abandoned.”68 Such a standard would, hopefully, 
marry the two wings of American stare decisis and provide predictable 
flexibility for courts and litigants. Looking to precedent from the 
Supreme Court of Michigan, Justice O’Connor provided the following 
tripartite standard: 
[I]n Ohio, a prior decision of the Supreme Court may be overruled 
where (1) the decision was wrongly decided at that time, or changes in 
circumstances no longer justify continued adherence to the decision, 
(2) the decision defies practical workability, and (3) abandoning the 
precedent would not create an undue hardship for those who have re-
lied upon it.
69
 
 
 65.  Douglas, supra note 44, at 736. 
 66.  Westfield Ins. Co. v. Galatis, 100 Ohio St. 3d 216, 2003-Ohio-5849, 797 N.E.2d 1256. 
 67.  Id. at ¶ 1. 
 68.  Id. at ¶ 45 (footnotes omitted). 
 69.  Id. at ¶ 48. The United States Supreme Court has not announced such a definitive rule, 
but has looked to the same kinds of factors when considering whether to overrule precedent. See, 
e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854-55 (1992); Citizens 
United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 362-63 (2010). 
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Importantly, the three factors are conjunctive—all must be met to justify 
overruling judicial precedent. 
Applying this standard to Scott-Pontzer, the majority concluded 
that it must limit Scott-Pontzer, and must overrule Ezawa, its companion 
case.
70
 First, the majority explained in detail that Scott-Pontzer was 
wrongly decided at that time, because the Court had interpreted the 
insurance contract in a manner that was inconsistent with longstanding 
Ohio law.
71
 Second, the majority explained in detail that Scott-Pontzer 
was unworkable and had “muddied the waters of insurance coverage 
litigation, converted simple liability suits into complex multiparty 
litigation, and created massive and widespread confusion—the antithesis 
of what a decision of this court should do.”72 Finally, the majority 
explained that there could be no legitimate reliance interests on the 
continuance of Scott-Pontzer due to the nature of the claims and because 
subsequent legislation had eliminated the claims moving forward.
73
 
Chief Justice Moyer, one of those joining in the majority opinion, 
also penned a separate concurring opinion to laud the new standard for 
stare decisis, explaining: 
The majority opinion . . . sets forth a tripartite standard that honors 
stare decisis by preventing arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of 
the law while relieving courts of the obligation to apply stare decisis 
with “petrifying rigidity.” . . . We serve the bench and the bar by 
adopting a cogent, clear standard by which to test claims that our prec-
edents should not be followed.
74
 
IV. THE DURABILITY OF THE GALATIS STANDARD FOR STARE DECISIS 
In the ensuing decade, the UM/UIM aspects of Galatis have faded 
into the past, but the tripartite stare decisis test has, thus far, shown 
lasting endurance. For example, in 2005, in State ex rel. International 
Paper v. Trucinski,
75
 and in 2006, in Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. 
 
 70.  See Galatis, 2003-Ohio-5849 at ¶¶ 2, 49-63. 
 71.  See id. at ¶¶ 9-42, 49. 
 72.  Id. at ¶¶ 50-57. 
 73.  See id. at ¶¶ 58-60. 
 74.  Id. at ¶ 66 (Moyer, C.J., concurring). It may well be that without the clear standard, Chief 
Justice Moyer may not have joined the majority. Ironically, the dissenters apparently discovered a 
newfound respect for the doctrine of stare decisis and argued vociferously that Scott-Pontzer should 
not be overruled. See id. at ¶¶ 75-101. But it has likely always been thus. Sixty-five years ago, 
Justice William O. Douglas observed: “Today’s new and startling decision quickly becomes a 
coveted anchorage for new vested interests. The former proponents of change acquire an acute 
conservatism in their new status quo.” Douglas, supra note 44, at 737. 
 75.  See State ex rel. Int’l Paper v. Trucinski, 106 Ohio St. 3d 203, 2005-Ohio-4557, 833 
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CompManagement, Inc.,
76
 the Galatis tripartite test was applied to 
uphold existing precedent and reject calls for a new law. 
In 2008, in Groch v. General Motors Corp.,
77
 Justice O’Connor 
authored another majority opinion that presented the opportunity to 
juxtapose the Galatis tripartite test against the manner in which the Ohio 
Supreme Court formerly addressed stare decisis. Groch involved 
questions certified from a federal district court involving the 
constitutionality of several statutes.
78
 One was a statute of repose.
79
 
Ohio’s high court had recently issued two conflicting decisions related to 
the question: Sedar v. Knowlton Construction Co. (which found a 
similar provision constitutional)
80
 and Brennaman v. R.M.I. Co. 
(overruling Sedar and finding a similar provision unconstitutional).
81
 
Justice O’Connor explained the history and rationale of Sedar, the 
analysis of Brennaman’s overruling of Sedar just four years later, and 
the Galatis tripartite test
82
: 
The explicit purpose of the Galatis test, which was developed after 
Brennaman was decided, is to provide a “well-structured method of 
ensuring a disciplined approach to deciding whether to abandon a 
precedent.” . . . Brennaman illustrates the pitfalls of a court’s applica-
tion of an unstructured approach to overruling a precedent. 
Although Sedar was a thorough and concise opinion that fully sus-
tained each of its specific conclusions with extensive reasoning, Bren-
naman is the classic example of the “arbitrary administration of jus-
tice” that Galatis cautions against. 
 
N.E.2d 728, at ¶¶ 5-15. International Paper was attempting to challenge the claimant’s permanent 
total disability (PTD) award and asked the Court to overrule State ex rel. Thomas v. Indus. Comm. 
and to vacate the claimant’s PTD award. The Court found that the Galatis tripartite test was not 
satisfied and therefore declined to overrule Thomas. Id. at ¶ 3. 
 76.  See Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. CompManagement, Inc., 111 Ohio St. 3d 444, 2006-Ohio-
6108, 857 N.E.2d 95, at ¶ 16. Cleveland Bar Association argued that CompManagement was 
wrongly decided. However, Cleveland Bar Association failed to satisfy the Galatis tripartite test, 
and the Court refused to overturn precedent. Id. at ¶ 21. 
 77.  Groch v. General Motors Corp., 117 Ohio St. 3d 192, 2008-Ohio-546, 883 N.E.2d 377, at 
¶¶ 132-38 (2008). 
 78.  See id. at ¶¶ 11-20. 
 79.  See id. at ¶ 94. 
 80.  See Sedar v. Knowlton Constr. Co., 551 N.E.2d 938, 949 (Ohio 1990). The issue before 
the Court was whether a ten-year statute of repose that applied to architects, construction 
contractors, and others who supply similar services was constitutional. Id. at 940. The Court found 
the provision was constitutional. Id. at 949. 
 81.  See Brennaman v. R.M.I. Co., 639 N.E.2d 425, 430 (Ohio 1994). The Court addressed 
the same issue of the ten-year statute of repose that was ruled on in Sedar. Id. at 430. However, this 
time the Court found that the provision was unconstitutional. Id. at 430-31. 
 82.  See Groch, 2008-Ohio-546 at ¶¶ 108-54. 
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Brennaman cavalierly overruled Sedar with virtually no analysis. In 
the process Brennaman failed to accord proper respect to the principle 
of stare decisis . . . . Brennaman illustrates why it is imperative that the 
Galatis factors be applied. Otherwise, the principles of predictability 
and stability are sacrificed for the sake of personal judicial whims.
83
 
Nevertheless, Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion in Groch did not 
overrule Brennaman but simply limited it to its facts—application to a 
different statute of repose.
84
 
In a signal that perhaps Galatis strikes the right balancing test 
between predictability and flexibility, Justice O’Connor’s majority 
opinion in Groch drew concurring and dissenting opinions. Justice 
Lanzinger, who joined the high court in 2005, authored a concurring 
opinion to Groch, in which she questioned “the continued vitality” of 
Galatis if it was going to be used to leave Brennaman intact “instead of 
forthrightly overruling a bad precedent.”85 
On the other hand, Justice Pfeifer, who had written the majority 
opinion in Brennaman, queried how Brennaman could have “morphed 
from a case worthy of citation . . . to an object of derision” in such a 
short time.
86
 He then criticized the breadth of stare decisis as set forth in 
Galatis, suggesting that the Galatis standard is too restrictive to allow 
precedent to be simply overruled: “Or is the majority simply forced to 
insult this court’s work in Brennaman because it has no basis to overrule 
it given the ‘judicial straitjacket’ the majority zipped itself into in 
Galatis?”87 
Thus, those Justices who desire to expressly overrule precedent and 
also those who desire to affirm it claim to find fault in Galatis. Perhaps 
that is as it should be. 
While the individual Justices grapple with the application of 
Galatis to specific cases, the Ohio Supreme Court seems to have carved 
out at least three broad topical exceptions to strict application of the 
Galatis tripartite test. 
First, in State v. Silverman, a majority of the court, including 
Justice O’Connor, held that the Galatis tripartite test was inapplicable to 
 
 83.  Id. at ¶¶ 135-37. 
 84.  See id. at ¶ 147. 
 85.  Id. at ¶ 219 (Lanzinger, J., concurring). Justice Lanzinger has expressed similar concerns 
elsewhere. See, e.g., Kaminski v. Metal & Wire Products Co., 125 Ohio St. 3d 250, 2010-Ohio-
1027, 927 N.E.2d 1066, at ¶¶ 106-08 (Lanzinger, J., concurring in part). 
 86.  Groch, 2008-Ohio-546 at ¶ 235 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting). 
 87.  Id. at ¶ 237. Justice Pfeifer has expressed similar concerns elsewhere. See, e.g., State ex 
rel. Shelly Materials, Inc. v. Clark Cnty. Bd. of Commn’rs, 115 Ohio St. 3d 337, 2007-Ohio-5022, 
875 N.E.2d 59, at ¶59 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting). 
17
Garner: Flexible Predictability
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2015
32 AKRON LAW REVIEW [48:15 
 
interpretation of evidentiary rules.
88
 The Court concluded this because “a 
procedural or evidentiary rule ‘does not serve as a guide to lawful 
behavior.’”89 Moreover, “‘as to such rules, stare decisis has relatively 
little vigor.’”90 In so holding, the majority found “Galatis must be 
applied in matters of substantive law” where reliance issues may be 
involved.
91
 
Second, in State v. Bodyke, a plurality of the court, including 
Justice O’Connor, held that the Galatis tripartite test was “inapplicab[le] 
to constitutional claims.”92 The Court in Rocky River found that the 
insurance and contract law context that arose in Galatis was different 
than constitutional law.
93
 The Court reasoned in Rocky River that 
“reconsideration of past decisions in the constitutional realm ‘is not 
some forbidden aberration. It is, in fact, the fulfillment of our 
constitutional responsibilities.’”94 
Finally, in Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson, a majority of the court, 
including Justice O’Connor, held that “while stare decisis applies to the 
rulings rendered in regard to specific statutes, it is limited to 
circumstances ‘where the facts of a subsequent case are substantially the 
same as a former case.’”95 The majority held: 
We will not apply stare decisis to strike down legislation . . . merely 
because it is similar to previous enactments that we have deemed un-
constitutional. To be covered by the blanket of stare decisis, the legis-
lation must be phrased in language that is substantially the same as that 
which we have previously invalidated.
96
 
After reviewing the statutes at issue in Arbino, the Court found they 
were “more than a rehashing of unconstitutional statutes” and, therefore, 
declined to apply stare decisis.
97
 
V. CONCLUSION 
For now, Galatis continues to provide the Ohio Supreme Court 
 
 88.  See State v. Silverman, 121 Ohio St. 3d 581, 2009-Ohio-581, 906 N.E.2d 427, at ¶ 33. 
 89.  Id. at ¶ 32 (quoting United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 521 (1995)). 
 90.  Id. (quoting United States ex rel. Fong Foo v. Shaughnessy, 234 F.2d 715, 719 (1955)). 
 91.  See id. at ¶ 31. 
 92.  State v. Bodyke, 126 Ohio St. 3d 266, 2010-Ohio-2424, 933 N.E.2d 753, ¶¶ 34-36. 
 93.  See id. at ¶ 35. 
 94.  Id. at ¶ 36. 
 95.  Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson, 116 Ohio St. 3d 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 420, ¶ 
23. 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  Id. at ¶ 24. 
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with a standard for determining when judicial precedent will be 
overruled or modified. But change within the law continues. In 2010, 
Chief Justice Moyer unexpectedly passed away, and Chief Justice 
O’Connor was soon elected to the post. Three years later, for only the 
second time since World War II, the high court saw three new Justices 
arrive: Judith French, Sharon Kennedy, and William O’Neill. 
Confronted with a similar situation 65 years ago, Justice William O. 
Douglas observed: 
When only one new judge is appointed during a short period, the un-
settling effect in constitutional law may not be great. But when a ma-
jority of a Court is suddenly reconstituted, there is likely to be substan-
tial unsettlement. There will be unsettlement until the new judges have 
taken their positions on constitutional doctrine. During that time—
which may extend a decade or more—constitutional law will be in 
flux. That is the necessary consequence of our system and to my mind 
a healthy one.
98
 
It remains to be seen how these new Justices will impact the Galatis 
test. However, whatever criticisms its detractors may have, Chief Justice 
O’Connor’s approach in Galatis has provided a fairly straight-forward 
analytical tool for considering the overruling of precedent where 
previously there was none. In doing so, it has provided both 
predictability and flexibility. If further change is considered, the 
“predictability” wing of stare decisis suggests that any new standard 
must retain sufficient definition to make overruling judicial precedent 
the exception and not the rule. To hold otherwise would be detrimental 
to the rule of law in Ohio. 
 
 
 98.  Douglas, supra note 44, at 736-37. With the United States Supreme Court, Justice 
Douglas did not have to deal with judicial elections potentially changing the composition of the 
court every few years. 
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